

GROUND RISK MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

Over the Measure

VOL 22 NO 8

<http://safety.army.mil>

AUGUST 2001

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
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Spotlighting the

INCO

CONTENTS



The Role of the NCO in Accident Prevention

An NCO shares his thoughts on NCO responsibilities for accident prevention.

6

Indiscipline Can Kill

Indiscipline has been a factor in 66 percent of our ground accidents this year. Read how leader involvement is key in stopping these accidents.



Investigators' Forum

The gunner asked his Bradley Commander (BC) for directions, but he never got a response. He looked toward the BC's side of the turret and saw blood pouring into the turret. A 22-inch limb had struck the BC in the face.

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- | | |
|---|--|
| 3 A Final Note on Change | 11 Training and Risk Management
Communication Is Key |
| 4 The Role of the NCO in Accident Prevention | 12 Investigators' Forum
How High Is Too High? |
| 6 Indiscipline Can Kill | 14 POV Safety
Consumer Advisory on 15-Passenger Vans |
| 8 The Deadly Truth About Army Wheeled Vehicles | 15 News and Notes
The Write Stuff |
| 9 Anyone Can Drive a Truck, Right? | 16 Poster
Nametag Defilade--Right vs. Wrong |
| 10 A Safety Letter of Condolence | |

DASAF'S CORNER

From the Director of Army Safety

A Final Note On Change



Sometimes change is subtle, sometimes bold. The Army has seen a lot of it, with a lot more to come. It doesn't take a keen eye to spot the bold change in the look of *Countermeasure*. I hope you'll tell us if you like it—and if you don't. More importantly, I hope you'll notice the more subtle changes in content and sections we've added, such as this one. The redesign is intended to provide you, NCOs and front-line trainers with more relevant ground hazards, risks, and controls information in a timely manner and with insights

on some 50-meter targets where your limited time and resources can impact most.

One thing has not changed. Accidents are still a major threat to soldiers. As we entered the fourth quarter of this fiscal year, our fatality rate was about 9 percent above where we were last year at the same time. While we are not achieving the overall 20-percent reduction in total military fatalities goal established for this fiscal year, command involvement is succeeding in reducing our privately owned vehicle (POV) accidents, notoriously the number one killer of soldiers. Currently, we are on target with nearly a 20-percent reduction in POV fatalities. However, fatalities from motorcycle accidents are on the rise. We must ensure that soldiers who choose to ride motorcycles receive the Motorcycle Safety Foundation Course at no cost to the individual soldier. There are still a lot of the 101 days of summer left, so we must keep the emphasis on POV, motorcycle, and water safety so that our success does not slip away.

Our ground on-duty fatality rates are up. Indiscipline—knowing the standard and electing to ignore it—is a factor in 66 percent of our ground accidents. I specifically ask for your help in focusing on the hazards associated with failure to enforce items such as the nametag defilade standard and brass and ammo checks, as well as all other pre-combat checks. Two soldiers have died in tank / Bradley accidents and two have died in live fire accidents this fiscal year as a result of their command's failure to enforce the appropriate standards and checks.

A final note on change. As I write the first Commander's Corner commentary for this inaugural color issue of *Countermeasure*, I realize it is also my last. I'm passing the responsibilities of the Director of Army Safety to Brigadier General James E. Simmons. BG Simmons will now spearhead the Army's continuing efforts to affect a cultural change where risk management is not just another safety requirement, but is fully integrated into all Army operations. I personally thank each of you for the great work you're doing in embracing risk management as a sound investment in readiness. An informed risk decision at the appropriate level is the standard we must meet because soldiers' lives are at stake. ☼

James M. LaCoste



(BG (P) LaCoste became the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel on 9 July 2001.)

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August 2001

20010817 073



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Countermeasure is published monthly by the U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5363. Information is for accident prevention purposes only and is specifically prohibited for use for punitive purposes or matters of liability, litigation, or competition. Address questions about content to DSN 558-2688 (334-255-2688). To submit information for publication, use Fax 334-255-3003 (Ms. Paula Allman) or e-mail countermeasure@safetycenter.army.mil. Address questions about distribution to DSN 558-2062 (334-255-2062). Visit our website at <http://safety.army.mil/>.

James E. Simmons
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Commanding Officer

The Role of the NCO in Accident Prevention

Soldiers who wear the noncommissioned officer chevron-shaped stripes on their sleeves represent a unique Army strength. Today's NCO is the front-line trainer and role model for our soldiers and the motivating force for driving down accident losses. The dedication of our NCOs was a key factor in this past year's success in accident prevention. In the following article, one NCO shares his thoughts on NCO responsibility and calls for even more vigilance so soldiers will be safer than ever.

"No one is more professional than I—the Noncommissioned Officer, leader of soldiers."

An ammunition platoon received a FRAGO to move quickly to another position. In their haste, they decided to forego a safety briefing. The NCOs failed to brief the convoy route, catch-up speed, and the hazards of night movement. They also failed to ensure their soldiers were using seatbelts. In the confusion of the hasty departure, one vehicle lost sight of the vehicle in the front, hit a guardrail,

and overturned. Three passengers received neck injuries. Is this an example of a "leader of soldiers?"

"I am proud of the NCO Corps and will at all times conduct myself so as to bring credit upon the Corps."

The speeding automobile ran off the road and slid sideways almost 200 feet. The car flipped twice and hit a tree, killing both occupants who were not wearing seatbelts. The drunk driver was an off-duty NCO. Is this an example of bringing credit upon the NCO Corps?



"Competence is my watchword. My two basic responsibilities will always be uppermost in my mind—accomplishment of my mission and the welfare of my soldiers."

As the number one cannoneer knelt in front of the breech of his howitzer to close the firing lock, the howitzer fired, striking him in the face. Is competence the watchword of the gun chief on this howitzer?

soldier failed to wear his seatbelt? Caring for soldiers requires us to take the hard right over the easy wrong, especially once the duty day is over. Let's be role models for our young soldiers—they are entitled to nothing less.

Is the NCO creed our standard, or is it just another group of words? I prefer to think that our NCO Corps takes the creed seriously, possessing a keen desire to make a positive contribution to their unit and the Army as a



"All soldiers are entitled to outstanding leadership; I will provide that leadership."

As we came through the ranks, our NCOs taught us the meaning of discipline, leadership, and standards. We must pass that along. Effective leaders identify hazards in night movements and take the proper steps to mitigate those hazards. Teaching and enforcing standards prevents young soldiers from screwing-up crew drills and injuring themselves or others. Disciplined soldiers wear their seatbelts. When was the last time you made an on-the-spot correction when a

whole. Each hour of each day, an NCO somewhere in the world enforces a standard, provides leadership, and instills discipline in a soldier that may prevent a future accident. These NCOs exemplify our creed and keep our soldiers safe. Let's all remember when it comes to safety: **"I will not forget, nor will I allow my comrades to forget that we are professionals, Noncommissioned Officers, leaders!"**

NCOs Lead the Way...Safely!

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INDISCIPLINE

There is an underlying trend becoming more and more prevalent in many accident causes. As leaders, we should be appalled at the fact that indiscipline is the underlying trend in several recent fatal accidents. The hard question is what is behind this trend? The hard answer is willful disobedience or disregard of a known standard.

Sadly, it appears the biggest violators are not even inexperienced soldiers, but leaders. The most common violators that we see from accident investigations are sergeants, staff sergeants, and young officers.

In one accident, a staff sergeant was in charge of a cadre-training event. This NCO gave guidance to the other cadre members to wear the required personal protective equipment (PPE) while operating watercraft (which is also a known/written standard). After reinforcing this directive several times, he totally disregarded his own instruction by not donning the appropriate PPE and not properly checking specific equipment on the boat. The NCO drowned in the river.

Another sergeant was performing maintenance on a weapon system while instructing a subordinate through the performance steps. The NCO was using the appropriate technical manual (TM) onsite; however, he wasn't following the TM's sequence. He also failed to read and adhere to the warnings found in the TM pertaining to this maintenance task. Consequently, a sudden release of pressurized nitrogen sent a piston into the sergeant's chest, killing him. It is very clear that the young sergeant was not setting a very good standard for his subordinate.

Failure in leadership doesn't stop there. The supervising team chief of this young sergeant also failed to provide his leadership at a critical point. He failed to check on his sergeant's progress when what should have been a 15-minute job had already taken him 4 hours. This fatality reeks of indiscipline, from the sergeant's failure to heed the warnings in the TM to his team chief's failure to supervise the job.


As we pointed out earlier, young officers are not immune to acts of indiscipline. One young lieutenant paid the ultimate price when acts of indiscipline resulted in a tank rollover accident.

During tank gunnery, the lieutenant allowed his driver to drive the tank in an unsafe manner, "power-sliding" around a concrete turn pad. The NCOIC of the range spoke with the lieutenant about the driver's recklessness and the fact that the lieutenant needed to keep himself at nametag defilade while acting as a tank commander.

The following day, the lieutenant failed to heed the warning of the NCOIC, and his driver once again attempted to power-slide around the turn pad. Unfortunately, the tank slid on some loose gravel, left the road, and rolled 360 degrees. The lieutenant was not at nametag defilade and the tank crushed him as it rolled. Certainly, we can see the effect of indiscipline in this accident.

How do we prevent indiscipline? The solution may be as simple as supervisors being in the right place at the right time, enforcing standards, and making informed risk decisions at the appropriate level. Will this stop all accidents? No, but if there is more **LEADER INVOLVEMENT** in the critical/hazardous points of certain operations, the accident rate will be reduced.

This is an emotional topic for all leaders. This article is meant to make you more aware of your actions and the actions of leaders around you. Indiscipline appears to be a current trend; we don't imply that all sergeants, staff sergeants, and lieutenants are undisciplined. Unfortunately, in our duties as accident investigators, we see mostly the failures of leadership.

We understand that there are disciplined leaders throughout the Army. In the every increasing OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO environment, leader presence and diligence in maintaining discipline in both their soldiers and themselves are key in preventing accidents. 

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The Deadly Truth About Army Wheeled Vehicles

The Army Safety Center reviewed all reported FY 2001 Army wheeled vehicle Class A-C accidents as of 14 June. We found the majority of accidents contained a combination of mistakes. Excessive speed was the most frequent mistake identified in the accident reports. Additionally, many accidents were caused by failure to take precautions for adverse environmental conditions and failure to stay alert to what was happening. Below are a few selected accidents that will illustrate these problems.

FY 2001 AMV CLASS A-C ACCIDENTS BY VEHICLE TYPE

HMMWV	31
Gov Auto/Sedan	23
HEMTT	8
5-Ton Trucks	7

*As of 14 Jun 01

A soldier was driving an M998 HMMWV on a state highway. The vehicle's approximate speed was 65 mph when it drifted into the adjacent lane. The maximum speed authorized for this type vehicle is 55 mph in accordance with TM 9-2320-280-10. The driver of the vehicle overcorrected to stay in his lane, but instead the vehicle crossed the lane to the shoulder of the highway. At this point, the vehicle left the highway and became airborne for approximately 20 feet before striking the ground. The HMMWV flipped end-over-end two times before landing in an upright position. The vehicle commander remained inside the vehicle and received superficial injuries. The driver was ejected from the vehicle during the accident sequence. He was evacuated to the nearest hospital, but his injuries were so severe that he died the following day. (Note: The accident investigation board was unable to determine if the driver was wearing his seatbelt as the M998 was completely destroyed in the post-crash fire.)

Failure to stay alert to what is happening

combined with excessive speed is a recipe for failure. The driver of an M998 returning from a LOGPAC mission misjudged his speed and the danger of the wet road conditions. This consequently led to the driver attempting to take a turn in the road too fast for the road conditions. This accident caused injuries to the driver and vehicle commander resulting in lost workdays. Damage to the overturned HMMWV was estimated at over \$2,300.

Excessive speed reduces driver reaction time and can increase the severity of an accident. However, accidents can happen even when vehicles are going slowly if drivers and vehicle commanders don't take into account road conditions. For example, an LMTV was going 15 mph on an icy road and lost traction. The driver released the accelerator, applied brakes, and attempted to counter-steer. This effort did not stop the vehicle from sliding off the road and dropping 4 feet into a rice paddy and overturning. The driver and two passengers in the cab were not injured due to their use of seatbelts. The eight passengers on troop seats without seatbelts in the rear of the LMTV received various injuries. Damage to the vehicle was estimated at over \$24,000.

These are just a few examples of the many wheeled vehicle accidents that have occurred throughout the Army this year. To prevent the next accident, drivers should not exceed the speed limit. This could be the posted limit for the road, or limits listed in the TM for on- or off-road use. When roads are wet or icy, drivers need to decrease their speed accordingly. Vehicle commanders must enforce the standard for speed limits. Learn from these accidents by slowing down and staying alert to what is happening around you, so you are not the next Army accident. Knowing these truths can keep you alive.

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Anyone can Drive a Truck, Right?

Some leaders think this is true. However, this is far from the truth. Up to 33 percent of soldiers entering the Army today do not have a civilian driver's license. And if they do have one, you could probably make a fair assessment that before they entered the service, half of them were driving either a compact car or maybe a sport utility vehicle at best. So, let me ask you that question again—anyone can drive a truck, right?

How many commanders have their driver instructor inspect soldiers' Department of Motor Vehicle driving records? Typically, we give a soldier 40 hours of driver's training, call him trained, and put him behind the wheel of a truck. Unfortunately, some soldiers never receive realistic driving challenges, such as driving on snow, ice, or mud.

I have inspected driver's training programs at divisions and below. I have seen some of the best driver training programs and I have seen some of the worst.

Upfront, let me say that managing an effective drivers' training program is not an easy task. First off, there is not an MOS or an authorized slot for a full-time driver's training position; but as you may already know, it is a full-time job.

I want to outline some of the requirements for an effective drivers' training program. While some people might think that it can't be that difficult, others might be surprised at just how much effort is required.

Your program is only as good as the command and NCO support channels make it. If commanders, command sergeants major, and first sergeants are not involved and supporting their drivers' training programs, more times than not, the program is marginal at best.

AR 600-55 governs the Army Driver's Training Program. There is a draft AR 350-XX scheduled to replace this AR 600-55, but it has not been released yet. First and foremost, AR 600-55 states that the program

will be consolidated at the battalion level. Para 4-2 states "Skilled noncommissioned officers, experienced drivers or operators, and qualified maintenance personnel do not necessarily make good driving instructors without special training. Selecting the best instructors available to conduct 'hands-on' performance oriented training is essential."

Instructors will be certified and the commander will appoint them. Unless otherwise stated, this applies to both civilian and military operators driving tactical and non-tactical vehicles and equipment. A license will be maintained on every person who operates a vehicle or equipment owned or leased by the Army.

To get a license, a driver must go through 17 different blocks of instruction in AR 600-55, Appendix E, Para E-3. Some of the blocks include: State and local traffic rules, accident avoidance, military convoy operations, off-road operations, written exam (vehicle specific), and response to emergency situation/vehicle malfunction, just to mention a few.

Sustainment training is required annually and focuses on individual weaknesses or other topics identified by the commander. In addition, if a driver has had an accident or a traffic violation and was at fault, he must receive remedial training.

The list doesn't stop there. I am highlighting only a few areas where I have seen problems. If by now you are not convinced that the Army Drivers' Training Program is demanding, look in AR 600-55. This program does not get the attention that is needed. So many of our soldiers are at risk because they are not properly trained or licensed. Leaders, let's get involved and make a difference.

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A Safety Letter of Condolence

I am well aware that you are an exceptionally busy leader burdened with important tasks. I also know your time is extremely valuable. However, I am compelled to write you this letter concerning the safety of my son. I am doing this in the hope that I will never have to receive a letter of condolence from you stating my son was killed in an unfortunate accident (especially if it could have been prevented).

My son is one of your soldiers. He is a private and an airborne military policeman who loves both his occupation and his country. His father and I are retired from the Army; therefore, the military is all he has ever known.

It is my understanding that 60 to 80 percent of Army accidents are caused by human factors. I also believe the Army has taken an extremely proactive approach to safety in the implementation of the philosophy of risk management. My concern is the soldiers at the lowest levels are not really brought into the loop as much as necessary. For example, recent statistics show the majority of vehicle accidents continue to occur in the 18-23 year old bracket, E1 through E4 ranks.

It seems the soldiers who are most vulnerable are the least trained in safety. Soldiers don't know what they don't know. Only by training soldiers can we truly prepare them to be successful and to survive in combat. When I say "training," I mean conducting safety briefings at the lowest first-line supervisor level, and allowing him to discuss with his soldiers the hazards they may encounter, whether it is field training exercises or simply an upcoming weekend or holiday. It is my belief that a proactive safety program is preferred versus a reactive one, especially when the stakes are so high.

I pray you do not equate my writings to just the ramblings of an old woman. I only want you to understand that no letter of condolence, posthumous award, or any amount of life insurance you would give me could ever replace my most priceless possession—my son.

My son is one of the nation's sons and daughters serving in harm's way. Risk management chain teaching is an excellent tool to familiarize and indoctrinate soldiers to accomplishing the tough missions safely.

I request that you and the chain of command consider teaching soldiers about safety, risk management, and risk assessments from the day they walk into basic training and continue throughout their career. Create an atmosphere where they can empower one another in the art of preventing fatigue, stress, and other human factors that result in success and survival in our inherently dangerous Army culture.

The majority of the time, soldiers want to do the right thing. Soldiers want to learn. They just need someone who cares and will take the time to teach them! Allow soldiers to feel comfortable enough to relate a problem to the chain of command once they identify it. Influence them to be responsible and accountable for their actions. Teach them proactive risk management now, so soldiers—like my son—won't have to wonder what to do when the time comes. There is an old saying in my family, "Soldiers don't rise to the occasion, they rise to the level of training afforded them."

Thanking you in advance for keeping all your soldiers safe—and alive.
Respectfully,
A Soldier's Mom

Communication Is Key

In previous articles, we discussed the first three steps of the risk management process: identifying hazards, assessing risk, and developing controls and making risk decisions. At this point, the controls have already been identified, selected, and used to re-assess the hazards to derive their residual risk. This article will address Step 4 of the risk management process —implementing the control(s).

Have you thought about how difficult it would be to tell a family member that a soldier in your unit died because an identified control simply was not implemented?

While leaders are good at identifying hazards, they often fail to implement controls needed to eliminate the hazards or decrease their risks. Once the commander or leader has selected controls, they must be effectively implemented or the entire risk management process breaks down.

Communication is key to implementation—

Ensure controls are communicated and understood down to the lowest level. This can be accomplished by integrating them into standing operating procedures (SOPs), written and verbal orders, demonstrations, rehearsals, battle drills, during mission or safety briefings, and back-briefs.

During orders production, the staff implements accident risk controls by coordinating across the staff and integrating them into the appropriate paragraphs and graphics of the operation order (OPORD). The controls selected, regardless of whether they already existed or are newly developed, should minimize the chance of accidents, and maximize the chance of mission accomplishment.

It is important to coordinate with adjacent units to ensure they understand the hazards identified and the controls to be implemented, especially if they will encounter the same hazards or play a role in implementing the controls.

Where the rubber meets the road—

The most important aspect of implementing controls is clearly communicating how the controls will be put into effect, who will implement them, how they will fit into the overall operation, and how the commander expects them to be enforced.

Staff sergeants and sergeants are leaders/first-line supervisors and as such, are key to implementing the controls specified in the operations order. For example, a control for convoy operations in adverse conditions is implemented that specifies maximum speeds and spacing between vehicles in the convoy. It is the squad or section leader's responsibility to make sure his soldiers are briefed on the controls, that they understand them, and comply with them in order to minimize the risk of an accident. The Army has entrusted its leaders with the responsibility to effectively train soldiers on their battle tasks and make sure those tasks are performed to standard. Implementing controls and making sure they are performed to standard is no different.

By applying *all* of the risk management steps, we can reduce the risk that we face daily—during mission performance and at home.

It is one thing to identify the controls; it is another to take action. Don't just think about it—communicate! Your life and your soldiers' lives may depend on it.

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How High Is Too High?

"Blue 1, this is Black 6, I want you to send one section of BFVs to relieve Red's infantry squad who are in contact with a squad-sized element..."

What happened?

After a long night pulling security for an aviation battalion, the mech infantry platoon returned to their unit assembly area to conduct maintenance, eat, and prepare for combat. As they were in the middle of pulling maintenance and reconfiguring load plans, the opposing force (OPFOR) probed the company, making contact with the unit's listening post/observation post (LP/OP).

One of the infantry squads from the company actioned against the OPFOR, but soon started to take casualties. The commander initially ordered the mech platoon to send a section of Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) to support the infantry, but subsequently decided to withdraw the infantry and let the BFVs fight the OPFOR alone.

The mech platoon section quickly closed up their engine access panels, threw gear in the back, and attacked toward the sound of the small arms fire. In their haste, the section became separated, as one of the BFVs was not immediately ready to move. Several radio calls followed as the second Bradley commander (BC) attempted to link-up with the BFV in contact with the enemy.

Motivated and hard charging, the second BC quickly grew frustrated when he could not find the first BFV or the enemy. As the second BFV came to a road junction, the driver asked for directions from his BC, but did not get a response. The gunner looked toward the BC's side of the turret and saw blood pouring into the turret. A 22-inch limb had struck the BC in the face, killing him instantly.

Why did it happen?

This unit normally trains at a post with terrain significantly different from that encountered at this training site. While attending the leader-training program and in conducting the train-up for this heavy-light rotation, the unit chain of command never identified hazards involved with conducting mounted operations in wooded terrain. The train-up focused primarily on 911 missions (quick reaction calls for assistance by light units or on battle drills).

The unit also knew about the chest (nametag) defilade standard in TC 21-306, but selectively enforced the standard. The BC routinely rode high in the turret back at home station because the terrain favored it and nobody made an issue of it.

Nametag defilade is a requirement for the exercise rules of engagement at all training centers. There was no indication that anyone identified operating in restrictive/unfamiliar terrain as a hazard; therefore, no one developed ways to reduce those hazards. The safety briefings consisted of telling soldiers to be aware of snakes, insects, to game play safety while in the maneuver box—"Be careful out there," and to use common sense. Common sense is a product of our life experiences. Many soldiers in the unit had never operated armored vehicles in restrictive wooded terrain before.

The platoon also failed to execute the appropriate battle drill correctly when going on the hasty attack mission. The accident investigation board determined that the

MISSION: HASTY ATTACK

Hazards

- Operate in restrictive / unfamiliar terrain
- Execute an unplanned mission

Controls

- Enforce chest defilade IAW TC 21-306
- Rehearse and execute Battle Drills
- Incorporate control measures for C2

platoon was knowledgeable on the battle drills in FM 7-7J; however, in charging off separately on this 911 mission, the command and control of the section was made more complicated as it attempted to execute the mission.

What to do about it?

Leaders at all levels must consistently enforce standards. Chest (nametag) defilade does more than just protect you in the event of a rollover. While the armored community focuses on rollovers, a Bradley commander (or tank commander) exposes himself to any number of hazards when he fails to maintain a proper body position in the commander's hatch. We must all train to and enforce known standards.


Train and execute battle drills. Battle drills allow leaders to execute complex or unplanned missions by using them as basic building blocks in the planning and execution of those missions. Battle drills are a form of risk management because they can enhance command and control, reduce uncertainty, and insert risk management into the military decision-making process during the planning and rehearsal stage of an operation.

Think about risk management in all that you do. You do not need a written product to conduct risk management. When you are sitting in your assembly area, take a moment


to think about the types of missions that you could receive.

You already know immediate action battle drills that you may need to execute. Take time to consider the effects of the environment (weather, terrain, time of day, amount of sleep you have had, etc.) on the execution of those missions. Then, identify and assess the reasonably expected hazards of your operation, and possible ways to reduce the effects of those hazards as you execute the mission.

A glaring example of identifying reasonably expected hazards while operating in wooded areas is the high probability that you will encounter low-hanging branches and limbs. Discuss this hazard with your leaders, subordinates, and peers. Identify ways of reducing the hazards and then execute this mitigation plan when the time comes. Leaders must supervise this plan and enforce known standards in order to tie it all together.

The Army needs hard-charging, motivated soldiers. Enforcing standards, executing battle drills, and incorporating risk management into everything we do will help us keep our hard-charging and motivated soldiers safe and alive. 

POC: Ground Systems and Accident Investigation Division, DSN 558-3562 (334-255-3562)



RESULT - 1 FATALITY

Consumer Advisory

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is issuing a cautionary warning to users of 15-passenger vans because of an increased rollover risk under certain conditions.

The results of a recent analysis by NHTSA revealed that 15-passenger vans have a rollover risk that is similar to other light trucks and vans when carrying a few passengers. However, the risk of rollover increases dramatically as the number of occupants increases from fewer than 5 passengers to over 10.

In fact, 15-passenger vans (with 10 or more occupants) had a rollover rate in single vehicle

crashes that is nearly three times the rate of those that were lightly loaded.

NHTSA's analysis revealed that loading the 15-passenger van causes the center of gravity to shift rearward and upward increasing the likelihood of rollover. The shift in the center of gravity will also increase the potential for loss of control in panic maneuvers.

Because of these risks, it is important that experienced drivers operate these vans. A person transporting 16 or more people for commercial purposes is required to have a Commercial Driver's License (CDL), which requires certain specialized knowledge and driving skills. Although the drivers of these vans are not required to possess a CDL, they should still understand and be familiar with the handling characteristics of their vans, especially when the van is fully loaded.


NHTSA's analysis reinforces the value of seatbelts. Nationwide, 80 percent of those who died last year in single vehicle rollovers were not buckled up. Wearing seatbelts dramatically increases the chances of survival during a rollover. NHTSA urges that institutions using 15-passenger vans require seatbelt use at all times.

NHTSA is making this information available because of these findings and because of several highly publicized rollover accidents involving 15-passenger vans loaded with college students (often driven by a fellow student rather than a professional driver).

While federal law prohibits the sale of 15-passenger vans for the school-related transport of high school age and younger students, no such prohibition exists for vehicles to transport college students or other passengers.

A copy of the NHTSA analysis of the rollover characteristics of 15-passenger vans can be found at: <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/ncsa/reports.html#2001>.

Media Calls: Rae Tyson (202) 366-9550;
Consumer Calls: Auto Safety Hotline (888) 327-4236; USASC POC: James "Al" Brown, DSN 558-3421 (334-255-3421)



Want to be a famous writer? The following tips will help you be the next best thing: a contributor to *Countermeasure*.

Perhaps you've never written an article before. Don't let that scare you. It can be surprisingly easy, and the results are rewarding. By sharing your knowledge, you can make a valuable contribution to those who need your information to do their jobs safely. Whether your story becomes a long feature or a simple tip, it may just save someone's life or an expensive piece of equipment.

Writing tips

First thing you need to do is decide what you want to say. *Countermeasure* is geared toward soldiers serving in ground combat and support units. It provides vital information in all areas of Army operations, from tracked and wheeled vehicles to tactical parachuting, and from explosive ordnance disposal to the rifle range. We print "There I Was" stories by soldiers about close calls or lessons learned the hard way.

Countermeasure also keeps you safe while you are off-duty. Some popular topics include POV safety, motorcycles, and seasonal issues.

Here are some ways to make your article come to life:

- Write about your own personal experiences. The tone should be conversational as if you are talking to a friend (because that's what you're doing).
- Keep it simple, direct, and easy to understand. Avoid language, jargon, or acronyms that may be unfamiliar to your reader. If you have to use technical terms or acronyms, include a brief definition.
- Articles should be typed in Microsoft Word format and double-spaced. Stories are restricted to four pages in length.
- Remember each issue of *Countermeasure* is planned 3 months in advance, so make sure your article is still relevant and will still interest

readers several months down the road.

Your article will be more effective if you help us find supporting photos or cartoons (see Graphics guidance below).

Submissions must include a printed manuscript, text on 3.5-inch disk, a cover letter, and complete photo captions. Mail your complete publication package to: U.S. Army Safety Center, ATTN: *Countermeasure*, Bldg. 4905, 5th Ave., Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5363. The most efficient way to get your story to us is by e-mailing it to countermeasure@safetycenter.army.mil. Along with your article, remember to include your rank, name, unit, address, and office phone number (commercial and DSN). You may want to add a brief biographical sketch for your by-line.

Graphics

Appropriate graphics enhance the reader's understanding and are important in clarifying most articles. Clear, sharp photographs are important. Photographs in JPEG or TIF files of at least 300 resolution are preferred; however, 5 x 7 color prints, negatives, and 35mm slides are acceptable.

Action shots are better than a lone piece of gear. Photograph soldiers or equipment doing something. Avoid boring static, posed photos. Photograph soldiers performing their mission, not just pretending to do it. (Be sure your photos do not show any violations; i.e., soldier performing maintenance wearing watch or ring, or soldiers outdoor without proper headgear.)

Help us make *Countermeasure* a hard-hitting magazine. Good photos don't need a story; we can use them for a poster or the cover.

For more information, contact Paula Allman, DSN 558-2688 (334-255-2688), countermeasure@safetycenter.army.mil/.

Nametag Defilade

Right vs. Wrong

RIGHT

To Standard



Not To
Standard



U.S. ARMY SAFETY CENTER

THINK SAFETY